NATO defense officials, including U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, recently met in Budapest, Hungary to discuss war strategy in Afghanistan.
According to the National Intelligence Estimate due to be released after the November elections — the contents of which were leaked to The New York Times — the situation in Afghanistan is “deteriorating rapidly.”
Some of the primary reasons for the decline in security are the weakness of the central government and corruption of government officials. Another reason is the booming opium trade, which comprises as much as 50 percent of Afghanistan’s economy and which funds the Taliban.
It is now clear that the Taliban was never destroyed and has recovered in force. 2007 and 2008 have seen record U.S. casualties and 2009 promises to be at least as bad.
The Los Angeles Times has reported that under a new strategy presently being formulated, U.S. forces will start training Afghani tribal militias — including past Taliban insurgents — similar to what has been done with great success with Sunni tribesmen in Iraq.
According to Gates, The U.S. is willing to reconcile with the Taliban. “There has to be ultimately, and I’ll underscore ultimately, reconciliation as part of a political outcome to this,” Gates said. “That’s ultimately the exit strategy for all of us.”
Gen. David Petraeus, now commander of the U.S. Central Command, which includes Pakistan, agreed. “I do think you have to talk to enemies … what we did do in Iraq ultimately was sit down with some of those that were shooting at us. What we tried to do was identify those who might be reconcilable.”
U.S. Gen. John Craddock, NATO’s supreme operational commander, also expressed his openness to talks with the Taliban as long as any peacemaking bid is led by the Afghan government. “I have said over and over again this is not going to be won by military means.”
Several commentators have made the point that the Taliban is no longer a unified, monolithic organization. Thus, negotiations should be geared toward undermining extremists by favoring moderate, reconcilable Taliban factions.
Of course, all of this conflicts with Bush-McCain rhetoric that negotiating with enemies in the absence of pre-conditions is appeasement. This was a major point of contention in the first presidential debate, as McCain complained that meeting with enemies in the absence of pre-conditions legitimizes them.
I see several problems here. First, how do you know what the “other” intends if you do not have an ongoing dialogue with him? It seems that using one’s imagination is the worst possible option.
Second, the point of dialogue is to work out differences and arrive at a compromise solution that meets both parties’ needs, thereby avoiding bloodshed. The bizarre need to have our enemies meet our demands beforehand defeats the entire purpose of talking.
Third, refusing to meet with our enemies leads them to do things in secret, such as with Iran’s nuclear program. Having a security agreement and trading with them would force them out into the light of day and also would give them incentive to maintain the status quo.
Just because we talk with someone does not mean that we are going to capitulate to their demands. If Iran, the Taliban or anyone else make an unreasonable request, then we should turn them down.
Christopher Herrin is a graduate Religious Studies major and a contributing writer for the Daily Forty-Niner.
