The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a terrorist organization known for carrying out public executions, crucifixions and other barbaric acts, has seized large swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria in its attempt to establish an Islamic state.
Professor Nathan Gonzalez is a political scientist specializing on the Middle East. He has published two books: “The Sunni-Shia Conflict: Understanding Sectarian Violence in the Middle East” and “Engaging Iran: The Rise of a Middle East Powerhouse and America’s Strategic Choice.” He is a part-time lecturer in the Political Science and International Studies departments and a Fellow with the Truman National Security Project.
Question: ISIS militants have carved a large swath of territory by toppling town after town in Syria and Iraq. They’ve developed remarkably formidable military capabilities and have used these to ruthlessly conquer territory across the Middle East. How did this organization originate and evolve into what it is today?
Gonzalez: ISIS came out of the remnants of the group we called al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Like AQI, ISIS came into being because of a power vacuum of a civil war, in AQI’s case the civil war in Iraq, and in ISIS’ case the one in Syria. ISIS was able to grow quickly for two main reasons: First, it captured oil fields in Syria relatively early, which allowed it to self-fund. Second, the Syrian regime did not directly target ISIS much initially, not in the way that it was targeting the more moderate rebel forces. This gave ISIS breathing room and a chance to grow. Now ISIS controls about a third of Syria.
Question: What are ISIS’ short term and long-term objectives?
N.G.: Like al-Qaeda in Iraq, ISIS’s goal is to hold ground in the heart of the Middle East and create a viable Sunni state there. They also see themselves as being in the middle of a sectarian war against Iranian backed Shiites in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. In this sense they are very different from the al-Qaeda organization that Osama bin Laden built, which was much more interested in fighting superpowers through symbolic acts of terrorism, especially outside the Middle East. And in fact al-Qaeda Central, which is now based in Pakistan, has rebuked both AQI and ISIS at some point.
Question: How do you think our previous military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan have influenced President Obama’s calculus of whether to engage militarily with ISIS?
N.G.: The great tragedy, as I see it, is that we’ve been overcorrecting for our mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan. If Iraq’s problems started because we invaded in 2003, they got worse when we pulled out troops and refused to act in Syria in 2011. In this sense both President Bush and President Obama have been wrong, but they were wrong for opposite reasons. The real challenge for the Obama administration will be to abandon its unwillingness to get involved in the Middle East, given that it is politically difficult to get involved after so many years of war.
Question: Military analysts seem to agree that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to beat ISIS without using ground troops. Although President Obama appears to have taken this option off the table, do you think it is likely that any members of the coalition might step in and do so?
N.G.: Currently the only viable ground troops are moderate Syrian rebels, Kurds, the Iraqi military, and the Syrian regime. These entities are either very weak or politically problematic for the United States, or both. The Untied States is hoping to build up forces over a long period of time while helping hold ISIS back through air strikes as much as possible. For that reason the administration has been offering a fairly long time line for success. It may be necessary for the United States to send ground troops at some point, although it is hard to imagine a viable exit strategy if there has been no political solution in both Syria and Iraq, which is asking for a lot. For historical reasons the idea of Arab and/or Turkish forces from other countries deploying in Syria or Iraq is out of the question, in my view. For these reasons the region might be looking at a long conflict. And even after ISIS is defeated, the core political problems that gave rise to it will remain.
Question: What is the state of minorities and women under the rule of ISIS currently?
N.G.: It’s hard to imagine it being worse. ISIS systematically uses rape as a weapon of war, and it targets Shiites and other minorities for execution, via organized campaigns as well as by setting up check points for the purpose of weeding out non-Sunnis.
Question: What do you think the chances are of enlisting the help of Sunnis in Iraq to deny ISIS refuge and to cooperate with our coalition?
N.G.: The situation would have to change on the ground so that they feel safe enough to do so. So far their choice, as they see it, has been ISIS or the Iranian-backed Shiite government in Iraq. Many have chosen ISIS.
Question: The Iraqi army has 250,000 troops, plus armed police, as compared to ISIS’ 10,000-35,000 strong fighting force, according to the CIA. The Iraqi military also has tanks, airplanes, and helicopters. Given all the billions of dollars and millions of man-hours in training that we have spent trying to bolster the capabilities of the Iraqi army, why have they still proven to be so ineffective at combating ISIS?
N.G.: The problem is related to morale, training and cohesion. The Iraqi military is simply not as motivated and as cohesive as ISIS is. ISIS has a sense of purpose and enjoys a better, less corrupt command structure. In Iraq sectarian divisions have plagued the military and even among Shiites there have been divisions relating to the political future of Iraq, including the role of Iran, with whom the previous prime minister was very close.
Question: Do you expect ISIS’ control over this region to become a long-term strategic setback that the U.S. will have to battle for decades?
N.G.: I think ISIS as a group can cease to exist, but the problem that ISIS represents—the endemic sectarianism—will remain for the foreseeable future.
